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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS 81
Under a separate and distinct charge of conspiracy to violate the Prohi-
bition Act and under conditions pertinent thereto the purchaser can be
prosecuted with the seller as a party to the conspiracy. De Witt v. U. S.
(1923) 291 F. 995; U. S. v. Slater (1922) 278 F. 266; U. S. v. Vanaxtta
(1922) 278 F. 559; U. S. v. Kerper (1928) 29 F. (2d) 744. But there must
be actual planning by the purchaser with the seller to justify a conviction
on this ground. So it seems clear that the casual buyer of liquor can be
charged neither with violating the National Prohibition Act nor with con-
spiracy to violate it. C. F. G., '32.
EMINENT DOMAIN-PoWER OF DOMESTIC CoRroRATioN ACTING IN INTER-
EST OF FOREIGN CoRPoRATIoN.-The case of Patterson Orchard Co. v. South-
west Ark. Utilities Corp. (Ark. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 1028, furnishes an
example of judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision with the
view to avoiding injurious effects and to facilitating economic enterprises
despite a relatively clear contrary intention in the provision itself. Held,
a domestic corporation, organized by employees of a foreign corporation,
which had been unsuccessful in condemning a right of way because foreign
corporations were prohibited by the state constitution from taking property
within the state, has power to condemn a right of way for an electric trans-
mission line and immediately lease it to the foreign corporation.
The decision is in line with the weight of authority, as exemplified by the
comparatively few cases passing on the question. At an early date, Lower
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1882) 59 Iowa 563, 13 N. W. 718, and In re
Staten Island Rapid Transit Co. (1886) 103 N. Y. 251, held that a domestic
corporation could condemn land for a railroad right of way, with the ex-
press design of procuring the right of way for a foreign corporation. In
Postal Telegraph & Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line Co. (1901) 23 Utah
474, 65 Pac. 735, the court said, "There is nothing in the letter, spirit, or
policy of the law which prohibits the same person from forming and con-
ducting two or more different corporations." In 20 C. J. 543, the rule is
stated: "The fact, however, that a foreign corporation is interested in a
domestic corporation, or owns the greater part of its stock and controls
its management, will not prevent the latter from exercising the power of
eminent domain." In Shepherdstown Light & Water Co. v. Lucas et al.
(W. Va. 1929) 148 S. E. 847, it was held that ownership by a non-resident
corporation of controlling stock in a public service corporation deprives the
latter of the power to condemn property. See also Snyder v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co. (1904) 210 Pa. 500, 60 Atl. 151. In Potter v. Gardner (Ky. 1928)
1 S. W. (2d) 537 it was held that foreign telegraph and telephone com-
panies need not domesticate themselves to be entitled to condemn right
of way across private property.
But in In re N. Y., L. & W. R. Co. (1885) 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27, it was
held that if the fact were established that the taking was not for the pur-
pose of enlarging the railroad company's road but for the sole benefit of a
foreign lessee an injunction should issue against the condemnation proceed-
ings. And Nebraska courts hold that a domestic railroad company cannot
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acquire land under its power of eminent domain and lease it to a foreign
company, since that would be doing indirectly what the state constitution
prohibits the foreign corporation from doing directly. State ex rel.
Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Scott (1888) 22 Neb. 628, 36 N. W. 121; Koenig
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1889) 27 Neb. 699, 43 N. W. 423. The principal
case distinguishes the Nebraska cases on the ground that the Nebraska
Constitution differs from the Arkansas Constitution in that the former ex-
pressly prohibits a foreign railroad corporation not only from exercising
the power of eminent domain but also from acquiring land in the state in
any manner until it shall have become a body corporate pursuant to the
laws of the state. The only pertinent clause in the Arkansas Constitu-
tion is, "Nor shall foreign corporations have power to condemn or appro-
priate private property." Const. Ark. art. 12 sec, 11.
The economic disadvantages to the modern big business projects under"
the minority view are clearly evident and seem to have been the chief
reason why the courts have quite generally allowed foreign corporations to
use this legal method of evasion. L. 0. C., '31.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-ATTACHMENT Fop RENT.-Plaintiff sued to re-
cover rent in aid of which an action of garnishment was issued and gar-
nishee summons served upon banks in which defendant had funds on de-
posit. On appeal it was held that the landlord's statutory remedy of at-
tachment for rent against the personal property, R. S. Mo. (1919) see.
6893, was limited to personalty on leased premises, precluding attachment
of tenant's bank deposits. Phillips v. Hunter (Mo. App. 1930) 31 S. W.
(2d) 224.
This case was one of first impression, the court finding no other authority
directly in point in the state. The Missouri statute provides that, "any
person who shall be liable to pay rent... shall be liable in attachment for such
rent ... sixth, when the rent is due and unpaid after demand thereof
.. . and that the person to whom the rent be owing ... makes an affi-
davit of one or more of the foregoing grounds of attachment and that he
believes that unless an attachment issue the plaintiff will lose his rent."
The section further provides that the officer be authorized to issue an at-
tachment for rent "against the personal property, including the crops
grown on the leased premises . . . " The plaintiff maintained that the
latter clause of the statute gave him a right of attachment of all the de-
fendant's personal property, whether on or off the premises. In refusing
to accept this interpretation of the statute the court reached the conclusion
that if the plaintiff were given a right of attachment to all the personal
property of the defendant, "a landlord would have a right superior to all
creditors in that his attachment would reach not only the personal prop-
erty on the premises, but also to any property belonging to the tenant no
matter where it might be found although none of it was ever located or
used upon the rented premises." This interpretation of the court in ef-
fect limits the statute to a declaration of the common law right of distress
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